Source: https://www.jurist.org/features/2025/01/14/interview-not-a-far-off-goal-palestinian-scholar-salman-abu-sitta-on-the-right-of-return/
https://x.com/pitasanna/status/1879249308479861172
Interview: "Not A Far-Off Goal" — Palestinian Scholar Salman Abu-Sitta on the Right of Return
Dr. Salman H. Abu-Sitta, a Palestinian academic, is renowned for his extensive work documenting Palestine’s land and people, as well as developing a practical return plan for Palestinian refugees. He founded the Palestine Land Society (PLS), accredited by the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP), and established the Palestine Land Studies Center at the American University of Beirut (AUB), housing over 40 years of his research.
Author of more than 400 articles and several landmark atlases — including the Atlas of Palestine 1948 and the Atlas of Palestine 1871-1877 — he has also created a series of poster maps related to Al Nakba. His memoir, Mapping My Return, offers a personal account of Al Nakba in southern Palestine. A former member of the Palestine National Council, Abu-Sitta has participated in numerous international forums on Palestinian rights and delivered a notable address, A Palestinian Address to Balfour, at the University of Edinburgh in 2022.
Abu-Sitta spoke to JURIST’s Senior Editor for Long Form Content, Pitasanna Shanmugathas, about his childhood in Palestine before the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 on his land, how he and his family survived the Nakba, his family’s current situation in Gaza, and his detailed proposal for implementing the Palestinian Right of Return.
This interview has been edited for clarity and concision.
Pitasanna Shanmugathas: Dr. Abu-Sitta, you were born in Palestine in 1937, in the Beersheba district. Could you describe what life in Palestine was like during your childhood, before the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948?
Dr. Salman Abu-Sitta: I was born in 1937 in al-Ma’in Abu-Sitta, a 6,000-hectare area in the Beersheba district that my family had owned for over 200 years. Al-Ma’in, named after my family, was part of a vibrant agricultural community. We cultivated wheat, barley, grapes, figs, and almonds, and raised sheep, camels, and cattle. My father built a school in 1920, a flour mill, with four silos for our wheat and barley, reflecting our self-sufficient and prosperous ways of life. Education was highly valued in my family — my father built the first school in 1920 at his expense, by the 1930s, my brothers were pursuing high school in Jerusalem and by 1944, four of them were in university in Cairo.
Palestine at that time was a land of established communities, rich culture, and resilience. However, British policies under the Mandate, such as facilitating Jewish immigration and land acquisition, began to destabilize the country. My father and relatives resisted, fighting the British in World War I, including at the Suez Canal, and later during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. My brother led the Revolt in the Beersheba district, where we expelled British forces for a year and even established a local government.
This resilience was met with brutal suppression by the British, who bombed Palestinian villages and supported the growing Zionist movement. By 1948, the situation reached a devastating climax. On May 14, 1948, the Zionist militia Haganah attacked our land with 24 armored vehicles, burning our homes, destroying the school my father built, and expelling us from al-Ma’in. That day, coinciding with the declaration of the state of Israel, marked the beginning of my life as a refugee — a status I have endured for over 28,000 days.
I never saw a Jew in my life before. I never knew who they were. As a child, I could not comprehend how strangers could come from distant lands to take what was ours, displacing a people with over 4,000 years of recorded history. This tragedy shaped my life’s mission: to document and preserve Palestinian history and advocate for our right of return. I’ve published several works, including the Atlas of Palestine and the Return Journey Atlas, which chronicle our land’s transformation and provide a blueprint for reclaiming it.
Our history and connection to the land remain deeply ingrained in my identity and my work, as I strive to ensure that the world recognizes the truth of what happened and the injustice that Palestinians continue to seek.
Shanmugathas: Talk about what was Israel’s purpose behind the Nakba.
Abu-Sitta: The Nakba was a deliberate effort to erase all traces of Palestinian existence. Even the roads that connected al-Ma’in to other towns like Beersheba, Gaza, and Rafah were obliterated and replaced with new roads designed to serve the settlers. It was as though they sought to rewrite the geography itself, erasing not just our physical presence but also our history. My family, along with thousands of others, was forced to seek refuge in the Gaza Strip. I was just 10 years old, witnessing the complete destruction of my home and community — a trauma that shaped my identity and my lifelong commitment to documenting and preserving our history.
After finding refuge in the Gaza Strip, not yet Israeli-occupied, my family’s priority was survival and education. My father sent me to Cairo, where my older brothers were already studying. I completed my schooling there and earned a degree in civil engineering. Later, I pursued a PhD in civil engineering at University College London, which shaped my career as a professor and later as an international engineer. Yet, no matter how far my journey took me, I was haunted by questions about what happened to al-Ma’in after we were forced to leave.
When I began investigating, I discovered that settlers had built four kibbutzim on our land — Nirim, Ein Hashlosha, Nir Oz, and Magen. These weren’t organic communities but part of a military strategy. The kibbutzim were constructed on elevated points for strategic advantage and surrounded by trenches, barbed wire, and fortifications. Their goal was clear: to prevent us, the refugees, from returning. They knew that we were just a kilometer away in the Gaza Strip and would always dream of going home.
This militarized transformation of our land starkly contrasted with the organic way our community had developed over centuries. Where our lives had been intertwined with the natural landscape — fields, orchards, and wells — the kibbutzim were built with cold, calculated precision. Aerial photos from the 1950s to the 1970s show how the destruction of our homes and the construction of settlements unfolded step by step. The settlers built huts first, then fortifications, and eventually brought Jewish immigrants from Europe and other places to inhabit them.
Shanmugathas: You mentioned that as a result of the Nakba you and your family became refugees in the Gaza Strip. Do you currently have family in Gaza, and if so, how have they been affected by Israel’s assault on Gaza following the October 7 attacks?
Abu-Sitta: Yes, most of my family still lives in Gaza, and their suffering is indescribable. The ongoing assault on Gaza has turned life into an unimaginable horror. Communication with them is almost impossible — telephones are often down, and when I do manage to speak to someone, the news is always devastating. For instance, in Khan Yunis, their homes have been completely destroyed, leaving them with no choice but to flee to Al Mawasi, a coastal area. There, they are living in makeshift tents, exposed to the elements. The tents are drenched in water from the rain, and with the harsh winter temperatures, the situation has become life-threatening. Seven children have already frozen to death from the cold. Now eight.
Sending them any form of aid is nearly impossible. Banks have been destroyed, making money transfers unfeasible. Even if money could reach them, it would do little, as basic necessities are unavailable or exorbitantly expensive. For example, a kilogram of tomatoes now costs 10 to 20 times its normal price. The scale of suffering is unimaginable. Some 200,000 people in Gaza — 10% of its population — have been killed or injured. To put that into perspective, that would be the equivalent to 34 million Americans being affected in a similar manner.
This is a genocide happening in real-time, visible to the world through the screens of our phones and televisions. It’s not a distant historical event — it’s unfolding now. UN agencies like UNICEF and OCHA have documented the atrocities extensively. The evidence is undeniable. Yet, despite this, the world remains paralyzed. Over 160 member states of the United Nations have called for a ceasefire, but their efforts have been vetoed multiple times by the United States. The U.S., in turn, provides Israel with the bombs, financial resources, and political cover necessary to sustain this assault.
As a historian and someone deeply familiar with global injustices, I find it astonishing that such atrocities can occur with the world watching and yet so little action being taken. No one can claim ignorance. Those who speak out — students, activists, and scholars — are silenced, often with severe repercussions. The question now is how individuals and nations will respond, knowing what is happening and understanding the consequences of inaction.
Shanmugathas: To our readers at JURIST who might be unaware, could you explain the concept of the Palestinian right of return?
Abu-Sitta: The concept of the right of return is, first and foremost, a universal and inalienable right for everyone. You may recall that on December 10, 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations. Article 13 states that everyone has the right to leave their country and to return to it.
The very next day, on December 11, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly passed the famous Resolution 194, which affirmed that refugees must be allowed to return. This resolution contained three key elements:
- First, refugees must be allowed to return to their homes
- Second, they must receive relief until this happens.
- Third, mechanisms must be created to facilitate their return.
Israel refused to allow the refugees to return but permitted relief efforts, as it was their responsibility to provide for the refugees they had displaced. However, Israel soon abdicated this responsibility, which was then transferred to the United Nations and managed by the United Nations Reliefs and Works Agency (UNRWA). Now, not only does Israel refuse to implement the right of return, but it is also attempting to dismantle UNRWA altogether.
The third element in resolution 194 was the establishment of UNCCP to plan the return of the refugees. It is still in existence but Israel does not allow its action.
Since its passage, Resolution 194 has been reaffirmed by the United Nations 135 times, making it one of the most repeatedly endorsed resolutions in UN history. This repeated affirmation effectively elevates it to the status of customary international law. No other resolution in UN history has been reaffirmed as frequently as this one.
People often ask whether the right of return is both legal and feasible. To address this, I conducted a study to demonstrate how it could be practically implemented.
Shanmugathas: Yes, and I want to get into the specifics of your proposal for the right of return. Before doing so, how would you respond to the argument that the Palestinian right of return is not binding under international law? Critics often claim that UN General Assembly Resolution 194 is merely a recommendation without legally binding force, as only UN Security Council Resolutions have binding authority.
Abu-Sitta: That argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, the right of return is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as an inalienable right. While it is true that UN General Assembly resolutions are non-binding, this case is an exception because Resolution 194 has been reaffirmed by the United Nations 135 times. This repeated affirmation has elevated it to the status of customary international law.
No other resolution in the history of the United Nations has been reaffirmed so frequently. Legal experts, such as John Quigley and Mallison, have extensively argued that Resolution 194 has transcended the usual limitation of General Assembly resolutions and now constitutes customary international law. Moreover, it is important to note that Resolution 194 did not create the right of return; it simply reaffirmed this inalienable right.
Second, it is contrary to the principles of justice to argue otherwise. You cannot justify bringing people via smuggler ships, arming them with foreign support, allowing them to dispossess, kill, and displace an existing population, and then claim that such actions are acceptable. This defies both legal and moral standards.
Shanmugathas: You gained international attention for formulating a proposal to implement the Palestinian right of return without displacing Israel’s existing population. When did you first release this proposal, and how would the right of return work in practice?
Abu-Sitta: I think I first presented this proposal in 1998 at a conference in London. The essence of my proposal is that Palestinians can return to their homeland without displacing the Israeli population. Many of my European friends, who support the Palestinian cause, argue that the return of Palestinians would lead to displacement of Jews who now live there. They suggest that if Palestinians return, it will create a “Jewish Nakba,” forcing Jews to leave and return to Europe. I challenge this reasoning, as it is both morally and legally flawed.
This argument suggests that we, the displaced Palestinians, have fewer rights to our land than the foreign settlers who arrived with military support, committed atrocities, and took our land. To me, this is not only a racist argument, but an illegal one. The logic is akin to saying that if a burglar enters your home, kills half your family, forces you into a shed, and claims your house as his own, the argument would be that the burglar has the right to remain simply because he has been there for some time. This reasoning is utterly unjustifiable.
Even if we take this argument at face value, the situation is far simpler than many believe. I’ve collaborated with institutions like Forensic Architecture at Goldsmiths College, using aerial photographs, maps, and historical records to trace the process of destruction and rebuilding. What struck me most in my research was the emptiness of the land. In my research, I found that 88% of Israel’s Jewish population resides in only 12% of the land, specifically in three major areas: Tel Aviv, Haifa, and West Jerusalem. The rest of the land is either militarized or occupied by kibbutzim, which were deliberately planted not as organic farming communities, but as fortified military outposts designed to keep Palestinian refugees from returning. These settlements were surrounded by trenches, barbed wire, and machine guns, particularly near Gaza, West Jerusalem, and the Lebanese border. The land outside of these concentrated areas is largely uninhabited, which presents a clear opportunity for the return of Palestinians without displacing anyone.
Despite the portrayal of densely populated Israeli settlements, vast stretches of former Palestinian land are nearly uninhabited. The reality is that most of the land is not occupied in the way people might think.
The key to implementing the right of return lies in the legal status of the land. No Israeli living in what is now called Israel has a title deed to the land they occupy. All the land in Israel is controlled by the Israel Land Administration (ILA), which holds the land of all Palestinian refugees and leases it out to kibbutzim and settlements. These settlers are not landowners — they are renters, leasing the land from the Israeli government, which acts as a landlord. But, for example, if the Israel Land Administration were transformed into the Palestinian Land Administration, Palestinians could return to their land, reclaiming what is legally theirs based on the documentation they hold.
In practical terms, the return of Palestinians could be achieved swiftly. I have mapped out the return routes for each refugee camp, detailing where each person originally came from in Palestine and how they can return. The distances are short — no more than 50 kilometers at most and in some cases, as little as 1 kilometer for those in Gaza. Refugees could easily walk home, and for others, buses could be arranged, with travel times of no longer than 40 minutes. This is not a complicated or far-off goal; the logistics are simple and feasible.
The real barrier to implementing this solution is not logistics, but the political factors that prevent its realization. The international community, particularly the United States and European powers, continues to block any meaningful action to secure the right of return. These countries provide military and political support to Israel, which prevents the United Nations and other international bodies from enforcing international law. The tragedy is that the solution is already clear, yet it is being blocked by powerful interests that prioritize political alliances over justice.
I would also like to point out that our case is actually simpler than many historical examples, such as the situation in Bosnia. When the Serbs attacked Bosnia and took over homes, the situation was far more difficult, as many people had settled into those homes, and there were complex issues of property rights and ownership. In contrast, the case of Palestine is much simpler. The majority of the land is either uninhabited or controlled by the Israeli government, and the rightful Palestinian owners still have legal documentation for their land.
The return of Palestinians to their homes could be done much more easily and quickly, and I am confident that it could be achieved within less than a month if the political will existed.
Shanmugathas: In your proposal, you divide Israel’s demography into three categories, Area A, Area B and Area C. Your proposal mentions that Area C would have a majority Palestinian population, Area B would be a mixed population, and Area A would remain predominantly Jewish. Currently, there are about 8 to 9 million displaced Palestinian refugees, while Israel’s Jewish population is approximately 7 million. Could you elaborate on the specifics of how these 9 million refugees would be allowed to return without significantly displacing Israel’s existing population?
Abu-Sitta: Drop the idea of A, B, C. I used that framework 15 years ago when it was a very approximate concept. Now, I approach it place by place, kilometer by kilometer. It is much, much simpler than that. The Israeli population occupies only 12% of the area currently called Israel. If you exclude open spaces, roads, and public areas, they actually live on just 2% to 2.5% of Israel, which itself constitutes 78% of historical Palestine.
We have no difficulty identifying where the 9 million displaced Palestinians live today and where they originally came from. Palestine is divided into 1,200 villages and cities, each with clearly defined land areas. We know exactly where the people from each village or city are, as these communities remain intact and connected. They can return to their specific lands without any issue.
The obstacles they would face fall into two groups: the first group is the Israeli army, which, in the future, should no longer exist. I envision — and hope — that the Israeli army will eventually be brought to the Hague, to the International Criminal Court, for its extensive war crimes. There isn’t a single member of the Israeli army who is free from such crimes.
Assuming the Israeli army is removed from the equation and held accountable at the Hague, the remaining obstacle is the kibbutzim. As I’ve explained the kibbutzim were established with the aim of holding refugee lands and preventing Palestinians from returning. If the kibbutz residents want to remain on a small portion of the land where their houses are located, I offer them the option to rent that space. However, they must return the rest of the land to its rightful owners. According to international law, this process would involve restitution and possibly compensation, principles that have been well established over the past 76 years.
It is not my duty to compensate settlers who have caused the disruption of Palestinian lives for 76 years. That duty falls to them — the perpetrators of these crimes. Restitution, whether material or non-material, is their responsibility. International law categorizes several types of restitution. Material restitution includes compensation for the use of land and property over time. The United Nations has already addressed this issue. There is a specific resolution, known as the Refugees’ Revenue Resolution, which obliges Israel to record the benefits it derived from refugee lands. This has already been documented, and we have the figures.
Non-material restitution, on the other hand, pertains to losses such as the deprivation of nationality, the destitution faced by refugees worldwide, the loss of identity, and the disruption of families. These elements are also well established under international law. Both forms of restitution — material and non-material — are essential for justice and the restoration of Palestinian rights.
Shanmugathas: In your proposal, you highlight the economic difficulties faced by the kibbutzim and the limited contribution of agriculture to Israel’s GDP. You suggest that the return of Palestinian refugees could help revitalize these areas and restore agricultural productivity. Could you elaborate on how this would work, how you envision the economic integration of Palestinian refugees into these areas, and how it would contribute economically?
Abu-Sitta: Most Palestinian refugees are rural people, as Palestine in 1948 was 70% rural and 30% urban. For thousands of years, these rural communities thrived and built a rich history. In contrast, Israelis who seized the land were reluctant farmers, resulting in agriculture contributing only 1% to Israel’s GDP.
Today, Israel’s economy relies heavily on technology, with 75% of its income derived from Silicon Valley industries that require minimal land — about 4 to 10 square kilometers could house all Israeli industry without impacting production. If necessary, they could even relocate their operations, perhaps to Cyprus.
The real issue lies with the kibbutzim, which control vast tracts of land and serve as extensions of the Israeli military. These lands are used for aggression, wars, and military camps, which would be unnecessary in the absence of conflict.
Another issue is water. Israel consumes 2,000 million cubic meters of water annually, three-quarters of which is stolen from Arab countries, including Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. Yet, despite diverting massive amounts of water, agriculture contributes just 1% to the GDP, an egregious misuse of resources.
This inefficient, artificial economy underscores that the right of return is entirely feasible. The obstacles are not logistical but political, driven by the same powers that repeatedly veto international efforts to address these injustices.
Shanmugathas: Your proposal implicitly advocates for a one-state solution, diverging from the longstanding international consensus of a two-state solution. Critics argue that the unconditional return of eight to nine million Palestinian refugees, as you propose, would result in Jews no longer being the majority in the Israeli state and thus is not practically feasible as Israel would perceive it as an existential threat to its survival. Academic Noam Chomsky once asserted that if Israel were ever put in a position where it was forced to accept the right of return, Israel would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons to prevent it from happening. How do you respond to this?
Abu-Sitta: I know your good intentions, otherwise I would not answer this question. I will not justify a crime or ask the victim to accept it. The two-state solution is inherently flawed, and history proves this. Since 1948, dozens of so-called peace plans — designed by the West to legitimize Israel’s actions — have all failed. Why? Because they attempt to normalize the theft of Palestinian land.
What does a two-state solution mean? It means taking land from Palestinians and giving it to settlers from abroad. Imagine telling a Palestinian refugee to remain in a tent while someone from Poland, like Netanyahu, occupies their home and land. For example, Netanyahu lives in Caesarea, [a town in present-day Israel] originally home to the Bushnak family, to which my brother is married. Should my sister-in-law be expected to give up her ancestral home to someone who arrived from Poland?
The answer is clear: no one would accept this. The issue isn’t about coexistence but justice. If any Israeli or Zionist can justify this theft logically or legally, I would willingly concede my land. But they cannot. Justice demands the right of return and the restoration of stolen homes and land.
Shanmugathas: The Geneva Initiative, negotiated in 2003 by former Israeli Minister Yossi Beilin and former Palestinian Authority Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo, presents a detailed two- state solution framework with specific attention to the refugee issue. The Geneva Initiative proposes an international commission to oversee implementation, including a valuation process for property claims using United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) and Custodian for Absentee Property records, with a dual-track system for small and large claims under strict timelines. Refugees must apply for property claims within two years and resolve them within five, with oversight from the UN, UNRWA, Arab host countries, and international donors.
The initiative offers five resettlement options: relocation to a Palestinian state, land swap areas, third-country resettlement, limited return to Israel, or remaining in host countries. By contrast, your proposal focuses on the direct physical return of refugees, emphasizing that 88% of Israel’s Jewish population resides on only 12% of the land. How would you respond to arguments that the Geneva Initiative’s compromise-based approach might be more feasible and politically viable with Israeli leaders and international stakeholders?
Abu-Sitta: The Geneva Initiative is just one of the dozens of so-called peace proposals that have all failed. Where is it now? In the dustbin of history. And where is Yasser Abed Rabbo, one of its architects? Politically irrelevant. These proposals fail because they are built on fundamental injustice, forcing victims to accept their victimhood while ignoring their rights. The Geneva Initiative is no different. It violates basic principles and prioritizes compromise over justice.
Shanmugathas: Many point to the absence of a strong, principled Palestinian leadership as a critical challenge to establishing a just solution to the conflict. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is often criticized for corruption and acting as an enforcer of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. There is division between political factions like Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. Figures like Marwan Barghouti are seen by some as a potential incorruptible leader. What do you think needs to happen for Palestinians to have principled, effective leadership?
Abu-Sitta: This is a vital question to end on. As a Palestinian, I oppose the PA, which was essentially created by Israeli occupation forces to suppress its own people, akin to Quisling’s role during the Nazi occupation of Denmark. The PA has lost legitimacy, as its leadership has not been re-elected in over 15 years, and it functions as a Western-funded tool to stifle Palestinian resistance.
For decades, I have called for new elections for the Palestinian National Council, representing all 14 million Palestinians globally. Starting with Edward Said in 2000, we pushed for such elections in 2003, 2007, and at international conferences, including one I organized in 2017 in Istanbul with 6000 attendees. Despite our efforts, colonial powers and financial support for the PA have undermined these calls, ensuring a leadership that prioritizes external interests over the Palestinian people’s will.
Elections must be held, allowing Palestinians to freely choose their leaders. Whether it’s Marwan Barghouti, who has shown resilience and principle during his years in Israeli detention, or others, it’s the people’s choice. Personally, I prefer younger leaders—highly qualified, articulate, and in their 30s—who can bring fresh energy and lead for decades. These individuals, many of whom I know from Europe and Arab countries, are well-educated in law, politics, and global affairs.
While elders like me can offer guidance and share experience, it’s time for the next generation to lead.